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Abstract Many if not all evidential languages have a mirative evidential: an
indirect evidential that can, in some contexts, mark mirativity (the expression of
speaker surprise) instead of indirect evidence. We address several questions posed
by this systematic polysemy: What is the affinity between indirect evidence and
speaker surprise? What conditions the two interpretations? And how do mirative
evidentials relate to other mirative markers? We propose a unified analysis of
mirative evidentials where indirect evidentiality and mirativity involve a common
epistemic component. A mirative interpretation requires a close temporal proximity
between the speech event and the event of the speaker’s learning the at-issue content.
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1 Introduction
The focus of this paper is a type of morpheme we refer to as a ‘mirative evidential’
(ME). Mirative evidentials mark indirect evidence in some contexts and mirativity
in others. We begin by introducing these concepts.
Many languages grammaticize evidentiality, encoding the type of evidence one
has for a proposition. The proposition that the evidential marks will be called
the ‘at-issue proposition’ p. Languages differ in the types of evidentiality they
mark. Cherokee (Iroquoian, North Carolina and Oklahoma), for instance, only
distinguishes direct and indirect evidentiality, corresponding roughly to first-hand
and non-first-hand evidence (Aikhenvald 2004: 26–7).1
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(1) a. U-gahnan-δ?i.
it-rain-DIR.PST
‘It rained (I saw/heard it).’
b. U-gahnan-e?i.
it-rain-IND.PST
‘It rained (I heard/inferred).’
In Cherokee, a grammatical sentence must contain an evidential marker; these
markers are encoded as verbal suffixes. (1a) is formed with a direct evidential, which
means the speaker had either first-hand visual or auditory evidence for the at-issue
proposition p (i.e., that it rained). The examples in (1b) are formed with an indirect
evidential, which means the speaker had something other than first-hand evidence
for p. Indirect evidence can be a report or the speaker’s own inference from a distinct
set of affairs. A natural inferential evidence context for (1b) is one in which the
speaker woke up, looked outside and saw puddles of water on the ground.
It’s been widely observed that evidential languages often have a polysemous
marker that in some contexts marks indirect evidence for the at-issue proposition
p and in other contexts marks that the speaker found p unexpected or surprising.
We use the term ‘mirativity’ to refer to the expression of speaker surprise across
constructions. In the case of mirative evidentials, we will refer to this as the mirative
interpretation (cf. the evidential interpretation) of a mirative evidential. The contrast
is demonstrated in (2) for Mapudungun (isolate, Chile; Aikhenvald 2004: 200),
whose mirative evidential is the reportative evidential.
(2) Aku-rke-y.
arrive-REP-DECL
‘S/he arrived (they said).’ evidential interpretation
‘S/he arrived (surprisingly)!’ mirative interpretation
In this paper, we address several questions raised by mirative evidentials. First,
what is the affinity between indirect evidence and mirativity such that this polysemy
is found across language families? Second, what conditions the two interpretations of
mirative evidentials? And, third, what is the relationship between mirative evidentials
and other types of mirative constructions?
In the next section we introduce the phenomenon of mirativity, focusing on how
it seems to be manifested outside of evidential markers. In §3 we’ll present several
empirical observations about mirative evidentials generally; in §4 we turn to focus
on Cheyenne as a case study. Theoretical preliminaries are introduced in §5 and in
§6 we present a unified semantic analysis of mirative evidentials.
2 Mirativity across constructions
Mirativity is the linguistic encoding of exceeded expectation or surprise on the part
of the speaker. We take the semantic contrast between English (3a) and (3b) –
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conditioned by intonation – to be all and only one of mirativity.
(3) a. John arrived on time.
b. (Wow,) John arrived on time!
Following Rett (2008, 2009, 2011), we assume that the mirative component of
(3b) is an expression of speaker surprise (see also Sadock & Zwicky 1985; Kaplan
1997; Michaelis 2001; Castroviejo-Miró 2006). It is distinct from assertions of
speaker surprise, as in (4), because it is undeniable in discourse, as seen in (5);
unembeddable under negation and other sentential operators, as illustrated in (6);
and incompatible with other kinds of illocutionary mood, as in (7).
(4) I am surprised that John arrived on time.
(5) A: (Wow,) Those cupcakes are vegan!
B: No, they’re vegetarian.
B′: #No, you’re not surprised/you knew exactly how incredible it was.
(6) a. (Wow,) John didn’t arrive on time!
b. Mary said John arrived on time!
(7) Where did John arrive on time!
English (6a) cannot be used to express that the speaker is not surprised that John
arrived on time. (6b) can express the speaker’s surprise that Mary said John arrived
on time; it cannot be used to express Mary (the subject’s) surprise that John arrived
on time. (7) shows that this mirative marker – English exclamation intonation –
cannot combine with question intonation. We account for these data by analyzing
mirativity as an illocutionary mood.
However, we will have little to say about what exactly mirative markers are ex-
pressing. Rett (2011) characterizes them as expressing “that a particular proposition
has violated the speaker’s expectations.” Merin & Nikolaeva (2008) characterize
them as expressing “drastic deviations from the speaker’s expectation.” Elsewhere
mirative markers have been characterized as contributing an expression of surprise.
As Rett (2011) notes, mirative constructions are very natural as compliments – as
in Wow, what a great apartment you have! – in which case they mean “something
like “No matter how high my expectations might have been, what I have just heard
exceeded them” (DeLancey 1997: 38).”
One final property of exclamations has, we believe, gone relatively unnoticed in
the literature. Their acceptability in a discourse is dependent on the relation between
when the speaker learned the at-issue proposition p and the time of utterance. (As
Rett (2011) argues, p must also be salient in the discourse context.) The contrast
between (8) and (9) illustrates this; despite Sue being surprised in both contexts that
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Bill is driving a new car, her exclamation in (9) is infelicitous because it is uttered
relatively late after her learning that he is. This phenomenon, which we refer to as
the ‘recency restriction’ on mirativity, will be further discussed below in Section 3.3.
(8) context: John and Sue watch Bill pull up in a new car.
a. Sue, to John: (Wow,) Bill has a new car!
b. John: Yes, how exciting!
(9) context: John and Sue watch Bill pull up in a new car.
a. Sue, to John: I thought that Bill was still driving a Nissan.
b. John: I did too.
c. Sue: #(Wow,) Bill has a new car!
3 Mirative evidentials across languages
In this section we’ll report three semantic properties of mirative evidentials (MEs)
based on descriptive work on the markers across languages. They are: 1) mirative
evidentials are indirect evidentials; 2) mirative evidentials can mark mirativity; and
3) mirative evidentials are subject to the recency restriction.
3.1 Mirative evidentials are indirect evidentials
Across languages, the evidential markers that can mark mirativity are indirect (rather
than direct) evidentials. They mark narrative, reportative or inferential evidence
(or indirect evidence generally) but never first-hand sensory evidence (visual or
auditory).
The Cuzco Quechua (Quechuan, Peru) ME can mark evidentiality only when
the speaker has hearsay or inferential evidence for the at-issue proposition p. Faller
(2004: 52) says (10) is “felicitous in a situation in which the speaker finds the pieces
of the broken cup, but did not witness the breaking itself.”
(10) Q’iru
cup
p’aki-ku-sqa-n.
break-REFL-IND-DIR
‘The cup broke.’
In Udihe (Altaic, Eastern Russia), the evidential interpretation of the ME is
acceptable only in contexts in which the speaker has inferential evidence that p
(translated as ‘it turns out that’ and ‘apparently’; Nikolaeva & Tolskaya 2001: 462).
In Cheyenne (Plains Algonquian, Montana and Oklahoma), the ME is the narrative
evidential (Murray 2010).2 On an evidential interpretation, as in (11a), it indicates
2 Forms of the narrative evidential include, for intransitive verbs, -neho for inanimate subjects and
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that p is part of a story, typically occurring with the remote past marker. The narrative
evidential can also have a mirative interpretation, as in (11b).
(11) a. É-x-hoo'ko˙hó-neho.
3-REM.PST-rain-NAR.SG.INAN
‘It rained long ago, it is told.’
b. É-hoo'ko˙hó-neho!
3-rain-NAR.SG.INAN
‘It’s raining!’
In summary, across languages the evidential interpretaion of the ME indicates that
the speaker has indirect evidence for the at-issue proposition p. This contrasts
with the mirative use, where the speaker can have direct or indirect evidence for p,
discussed below.
3.2 Mirative evidentials can mark mirativity
Mirative evidentials can mark mirativity in a context regardless of what type of
evidence the speaker has for the at-issue proposition p. Their mirative use is char-
acterized as indicating that the speaker had no “premonitory awareness” that p
(Slobin & Aksu 1982: 196); as signalling “unanticipated/novel information” or
an “unprepared mind” (DeLancey 1997; Peterson 2010); or as marking “a more
or less spontaneous reaction to a new, salient, often surprising event” (Aikhenvald
2004: 197). They are typical in contexts of discovery, as demonstrated by the Lhasa
Tibetan (Tibeto-Burman, China) minimal pair in (12) (DeLancey 1992: 43–44).
(12) a. Ngar
I:DAT
dngul
money
tog=tsam
some
yod.
DIR
‘I have some money.’
b. Ngar
I:DAT
dngul
money
tog=tsam
some
’dug.
IND
‘I have some money!’
This minimal pair parallels the English one in (3). Lhasa Tibetan (12a) involves a
direct evidential, and is natural in any context in which the speaker has first-hand
evidence of having money. (12b), in contrast, is formed with a mirative (indirect)
evidential marker. It too is acceptable in a context in which the speaker has first-hand
evidence of the at-issue proposition p, but it is most natural in a context in which the
speaker has only just discovered that he has money in his pocket.
-hoo'o for third person singular subjects Leman (2012).
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The mirative interpretation of MEs is available regardless of evidence type (De-
Lancey 1997, 2001). That is, while mirative interpretations are most naturally elicited
in direct-evidence scenarios, they are also possible in indirect-evidence scenarios,
including the type of evidence marked by the ME’s evidential interpretation.
The ME construction from Tsafiki (Barbacoan, Ecuador) in (13) demonstrates
this first point; a natural context for the mirative interpretation is “one in which
the speaker heard what he thought was a car approaching. But when he saw it, he
realized it was a motorcycle” (Dickinson 2000: 411).3
(13) Moto
motorcycle
ju-nu-e.
be-INFR-DECL
‘It is apparently a motorcycle.’ or ‘It’s a motorcycle!’
But mirative uses of MEs aren’t restricted to direct-evidence contexts. Example
(14) from Sunwar (Tibeto-Burman, Nepal) is natural in direct evidence contexts, but
“could also be a report of hearsay, but only in circumstances which emphasize the
fact that the information was not otherwise available” (DeLancey 1997: 41).4
(14) Tangka
Tangka
Kathmandu-m
Kathmandu-LOC
’baâ-te.
IND-3SG.PAST
‘Tangka is in Kathmandu.’
It’s often observed that mirative constructions make natural compliments (this
use is referred to as a ‘pragmatic extension’ of MEs in Slobin & Aksu (1982)). The
utterance of (15) in Cuzco Quechua “does not convey that they had thought the
addressee was a bad cook” (Faller 2004: 53), or that the speaker had expected the
soup to be bad, in a context in which the speaker is complimenting the addressee.
(15) Lawa-yki-qa
soup-2-TOP
sumaq-mi
nice-DIR
ka-sqa!
be-IND.PST
‘Your soup is very tasty!’
3 That this form is acceptable in a direct-evidence scenario led Dickinson (and DeLancey before her) to
conclude that the inferential evidential (nu in Tsafiki) is not in fact an evidential. But it’s important to
separate the two interpretations: the evidential interpretations of MEs impose an evidential restriction,
while their mirative interpretations do not.
4 “For example, I suggested to my consultant, as a context for (22), a situation in which the speaker has
just learned of Tangka’s whereabouts through a phone conversation with someone in Kathmandu, and
is reporting it to someone else. He was more comfortable with the mirative form in this context given
some elaboration of the context, for example, if the speaker (and probably, though not necessarily,
the addressee) had been trying unsuccessfully to ascertain Tangka’s whereabouts – a situation which
makes as explicit as possible the unavailability of the information to the speaker through any other
channel than the one which he bases his report” (DeLancey 1997: 42).
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DeLancey (1997: 38) argues that this interpretation “follows directly from the ‘new
knowledge’ interpretation.”
3.3 Mirative evidentials and the recency restriction
We argue that the restriction on the mirative interpretation of MEs is a restriction
on all mirative constructions: they are licensed only when the speaker has recently
learned the at-issue proposition p. This restriction was demonstrated briefly for
exclamations in English in (8) and (9). It is also widely regarded in the descriptive
literature as a condition for mirative use of MEs. Describing the Cuzco Quechua
ME, Faller (2004: 53) says it “would usually be uttered at the time the speaker is
perceiving the surprising situation.” In Tibeto-Burman languages, the evidential
system is encoded in the copular system. Historically, the mirative evidential has
been characterized as marking ‘new knowledge’ (DeLancey 1997, 2001).
The minimal pair from Turkish in (16) shows that the ME mIs¸ – whose evidential
interpretation marks indirect evidence (typically inference or hearsay) – is acceptable
in a situation in which the speaker has direct evidence that Kemal came. In this
case, the difference between the non-evidential construction in (16a) and the ME
construction in (16b) is that the latter (the mirative evidential) is available in a
situation in which “[t]he speaker hears someone approach, opens the door, and sees
Kemal – a totally unexpected visitor” (Slobin & Aksu 1982: 187).
(16) a. Kemal
Kemal
gel-di.
come-PST
‘Kemal came.’
b. Kemal
Kemal
gel-mIs¸.
come-IND
‘Kemal came.’
The mirative interpretation of the Kalasha (Indo-Aryan, Pakistan) ME sentence
in (17) is described by DeLancey (1997: 47–8) as natural “when the speaker first
sees the work that his friend has accomplished.”
(17) Aj’ab
remarkable
krom
work
ka’da-his.
do.PST.IMPF-IND.2SG
‘You have done a remarkable job!’
In Tsafiki, the ME in (18b) is used, according to Dickinson (2000: 399), “[w]hen
you get to the house you realize that you have been there before with Carlos. [...] If
you were already aware that you had been there before you would use” the direct
evidential (18a).
(18) a. Tse
1FEM
Carlos=be
Carlos=ASSOC
in=te
DEM=LOC
fa-yo-e.
arrive.here-DIR-DECL
‘I’ve come here (before) with Carlos.’
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b. Carlos=be
Carlos=ASSOC
tse
1FEM
in=te
DEM=LOC
fa-i-e.
arrive.here-IND-DECL
‘I’ve come here (before) with Carlos! (I just realized it).’
In Cheyenne, an ME is felicitous if the speaker has narrative evidence for the at-
issue proposition p, i.e., if p is part of a story (the evidential use) or if she has recently
learned that p (the mirative use). For example, Cheyenne (11b) is infelicitous in a
context where the speaker learned that p long before she utters (11b).
4 Cheyenne: a case study
In this section, we address the following question: what type of content is the
mirative component of mirative evidentials?
Languages seem to differ in the sort of content evidentiality is encoded in. Faller
(2002, 2006) argues that one evidential strategy in Cuzco Quechua encodes eviden-
tiality at the speech-act level, but another strategy is modal-like (see also Matthewson,
Davis & Rullmann (2007) for modal analysis of evidentials in St’át’imcets). Murray
(2010, to appear) argues that evidentiality in Cheyenne and crosslinguistically is
encoded in not-at-issue content, though it may also affect the force of the sentence.
There is a similar debate in the literature on mirativity, broadly construed. Rett
(2009, 2011) characterizes the mirativity as illocutionary (a speech act in which the
speaker simultaneously asserts and expresses surprise that p). In contrast, Merin &
Nikolaeva (2008); Gutzmann (2011); Chernilovskaya, Condoravdi & Lauer (2012)
argue that mirativity is not-at-issue content or conventional implicature.
We argue that, at least for Cheyenne, the evidential contribution of an ME is
not-at-issue content, but the mirative contribution – like mirativity in exclamations –
is illocutionary or speech-act content.
4.1 Cheyenne evidentiality is not-at-issue content
Murray (2010, 2011, to appear) argues that evidentiality in Cheyenne is encoded in
not-at-issue content (though evidentials can also affect the force of the sentence).
In contrast to at-issue content, evidential content is not directly challengeable, as in
(19) for the reportative evidential, nor is it, e.g., embeddable under negation.
(19) a. Méave'ho'eno
Lame Deer
é-hésta˙he-se˙stse
3-be.from-RPT.3SG
Mókéé'e.
Mókéé'e
‘Mókéé′e is from Lame Deer, I hear.’
b. É-sáa-hetóme˙stove˙-hane- /0.
3-neg-be.true-MODB-DIR
É-sáa-hésta˙hé-he- /0
3-neg-be.from-MODA-DIR
Méave'ho'eno.
Lame Deer
‘That’s not true. She’s not from Lame Deer.’
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c. #É-sáa-hetóme˙stove˙-hane- /0.
3-neg-be.true-MODB-DIR
Hovánee'e
nobody
é-sáa-ne˙-hé-he- /0.
3-neg-that-say-MODA-DIR
Intended: ‘That’s not true. Nobody said that.’
Evidentials in Cheyenne participate in a phenomenon called ‘interrogative flip’
(Faller 2002, among others). This is demonstrated in (20) for the evidential in-
terpretation of the narrative evidential (see (11)). In declaratives, evidentiality is
speaker-oriented – it reflects the speaker’s source of evidence for p, as in (19). But in
interrogatives like (20), the evidential becomes hearer-oriented, indicating the source
of evidence the hearer is expected to have for the answer (p or ¬p). For example,
Cheyenne (20) asks whether Hawk won, assuming the hearer has narrative evidence
for the answer.
(20) Mó=é-x-hó'ta˙hevá-hoo'o
y/n=3-REM.PST-win-NAR.3SG
Aénohe?
Hawk
‘Given the stories you heard, did Hawk win?’
4.2 Cheyenne mirativity is illocutionary content
As discussed above for (11), the mirative evidential in Cheyenne is the narrative
evidential. Just like the evidential contribution of the Cheyenne ME, its mirative
contribution, too, is undeniable and unembeddable. However, the mirative use
patterns with other illocutionary mood or speech-act markers, instead of not-at-issue
meanings, in two ways. First, the mirative use doesn’t participate in interrogative
flip; in questions, the ME cannot receive a mirative interpretation, as in (21).
(21) %Mó=é-hó'ta˙hevá-hoo'o
y/n=3-win-NAR.3SG
Aénohe?
Hawk
Intended: ‘Given your surprise, did Hawk win?’ / ‘Did Hawk really win?!’
(21) may have an evidential interpretation, similar to (20), but it cannot receive a
mirative interpretation (we use % to mark unavailability of the intended reading).
Second, denial of mirativity has a different semantic status than the denial of
the evidential component. Murray (2010, 2011) shows that challenging Cheyenne
evidentiality results in a sense of contradiction, as shown in (22) (marked with #⊥).
(22) #⊥É-hó'ta˙heva-se˙stse
3-win-RPT.3SG
Aénohe
Hawk
naa oha
but
hovánee'e
nobody
é-sáa-ne˙-hé-he- /0.
3-neg-that-say-MODA-DIR
Intended: ‘Hawk won, it’s said, but nobody said that.’
This seems to parallel the behavior of evidential adverbials in English and (other)
non-at-issue content, like that encoded in appositives (Potts 2005), as (23) shows.
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(23) a. Allegedly, Roger shoplifts. #⊥Though no one has ever said so.
b. Gabe, who graduated from Rutgers, teaches at UCLA. #⊥He never
graduated from Rutgers.
This contradiction is arguably distinct from the infelicity associated with denial
of speech-act-level content, as in (24). For example, in ‘Moore’s Paradox’ sentences
like (24a), the speaker denies a sincerity condition on assertion, not literal content.
(24) a. It’s raining, #but I don’t believe it’s raining.
b. Does Sue like pizza? ...#I don’t want to know.
English exclamations, too, exhibit Moore’s Paradox-like effects, as (25) shows. This
supports the claim that mirativity is an illocutionary phenomenon.
(25) a. Gabe arrived on time! ...#I’m not surprised, I knew he’d be on time.
b. How incredibly early Gabe was for his flight! ...#I’m not surprised, he
arrived exactly when I thought he would.
When the Cheyenne narrative evidential receives a mirative interpretation, denial
of the mirative content – in contrast to its evidential interpretation as in (22) – also
results in infelicity rather than contradiction. For example, Cheyenne (26) is an
expression you could use if you had expected that it would rain and you go outside
and see that it is in fact raining. Though both (26) and the mirative construction
(11b) are used when it is actually raining, (26) indicates the rain was expected and is
infelicitous as a follow up (11b), as in (27).
(26) Ná-ne˙še˙-héne'ena- /0
1-continue-know.s.t-DIR
tsé-to'se˙-heše˙-hoo'koho.
CNJ-going.to-how-rain
‘I knew it was going to rain.’
(27) É-hoo'ko˙hó-neho!
3-rain-NAR.SG.INAN
...# Ná-ne˙še˙-héne'ena- /0
1-continue-know.s.t-DIR
tsé-to'se˙-heše˙-hoo'koho.
CNJ-going.to-how-rain
Intended: ‘It’s raining! ... # I knew it was going to rain.’
To sum up: the Cheyenne mirative evidential is the narrative evidential. Cheyenne
evidential markers encode not-at-issue content. Their evidential contribution is un-
embeddable and undeniable in a particular way: as with English not-at-issue content,
their denial results in contradiction. The evidential contribution also participates
in interrogative flip: in interrogatives, the evidential is anchored to the addressee,
as opposed to the speaker. But while the mirative contribution of the Cheyenne
ME is also unembeddable, it seems to be undeniable in a different way, patterning
more with instances of Moore’s Paradox than with contradiction. Furthermore, the
mirative contribution of the Cheyenne ME does not participate in interrogative flip:
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the mirative interpretation is unavailable in questions. These differences lead us
to conclude that the evidential use of at least the Cheyenne ME involves not-at-
issue content, but the mirative use – like intonational mirative markers in English
exclamation – involves illocutionary content.
5 Theoretical preliminaries
In this section, we introduce the formal mechanisms that underlie two key assump-
tions of our account. First, the recency restriction, that mirative contexts differ from
other contexts in the relative timing of the learning event (the speaker’s learning that
p) and the speech event. Second, indirect evidentials and mirative markers have in
common that they, in contrast to direct evidentials, relate the at-issue proposition
p to some contextually salient set E of epistemically accessible propositions. We
begin by discussing some theoretical preliminaries.
5.1 Mirativity as an illocutionary mood
The Cheyenne mirative evidential makes two distinct types of semantic contributions.
To address this formally, we adopt the encoding of evidentiality as not-at-issue con-
tent detailed in Murray (2010, to appear) and the notion of mirativity as illocutionary
or speech-act-level content outlined in Rett (2011).
Murray (2010, to appear) argues that all sentences can make three semantic
contributions: an at-issue proposition, a not-at-issue restriction (contributed by not-
at-issue content, if there is any), and an illocutionary relation (contributed by mood).
For example, consider English (28a); we will assume that appositives contribute
not-at-issue content. The three contributions of (28a) can be informally represented
as (28b); for formal implementation see Murray (2010, to appear).
(28) a. Hawk, a champion runner, won (the race yesterday).
b.
at-issue proposition p = λw. hawk won in w
not-at-issue restriction hawk is a champion runner
illocutionary relation propose to add p to CG
These three semantic contributions are distinguished by the kinds of updates they
introduce, but are all integrated into the same semantic representation. The at-
issue proposition is represented by a discourse referent. The not-at-issue restriction
directly adds the not-at-issue content to the common ground. The illocutionary
relation is treated as an update that structures the context. For assertions, this is
the proposal to add the at-issue proposition to the common ground (CG). For polar
questions, the context set is partitioned into the semantic answers. Other moods can
be analyzed as other kinds of structuring updates.
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Rett (2011) encodes mirativity in an illocutionary operator E-FORCE. She
assumes that the speech act of exclamation has as a subcomponent the speech act of
assertion. (This characterization of complex speech acts is explored in Vanderveken
(1990), which defines this relationship in terms of ‘illocutionary entailment’.)
(29) E-FORCE(p), when uttered by sC, is appropriate in a context C if p is salient
and true in wC. When appropriate, E-FORCE(p) counts as an expression
that sC had not expected that p. (Rett 2011: 429)
The result is a semantic characterization of English exclamations in which they
denote an at-issue proposition p and simultaneously trigger an act of assertion and
an act of expression. Transposing this analysis into the structured representations
from Murray (2010, to appear), this can be informally represented as (30).
(30) a. Hawk won (the race yesterday)!
b.
at-issue proposition p = λw. hawk won in w
not-at-issue restriction
illocutionary relation propose to add p to CG
speaker did not expect that p
As mentioned above, Murray (2010, to appear) treats the semantic contribution
of mood in terms of how it structures the context. We will do the same for the
expressive component of mirativity and revise (30) accordingly.
5.2 The recency restriction
We’ve argued that exclamations ((8) and (9)) and the mirative interpretations of MEs
(§3.3) are both subject to the recency restriction. In other words, these mirative
interpretations are only available relatively recently after the speaker’s learning
that p. In this section, we’ll draw on the recency restriction to condition the two
interpretations of MEs.
It seems like the recency restriction cannot be characterized simply in terms
of immediate temporal precedence; rather, what counts as recent seems to vary
from context to context. In particular, it seems as though a speaker can utter an
exclamation like Bill has a new car! at different times to different interlocutors, as
long as p is relevant and as long as the time of utterance is the first opportunity the
speaker has to express surprise to that interlocutor that p.
So instead of characterizing the recency restriction temporally, we characterize
it aspectually, in terms of the relationship between the speech event and the ‘target
state’ of the learning event (see also Nikolaeva 1999; Koev 2011). We follow Parsons
(1990) in differentiating between permanent result or consequent states on the one
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hand and potentially temporary target states on the other.
Parsons (1990: 235) describes the target state of an event of throwing a ball on
a roof as the (temporary) effect of the ball being on the roof. Arguably, then, the
target state of an individual x learning that p is the (temporary) effect of p on x, the
change of the state of the speaker’s knowledge and expectations. If, as with mirative
constructions, the speaker did not expect that p, then this effect is something like
surprise, and the target state of the learning event el lasts as long as the speaker’s
surprise. If, as with the discourse particle alas, the speaker had hoped that ¬p, this
effect is regret, and the target state of el lasts as long as the regret does. We will thus
characterize the recency restriction as follows:
(31) THE RECENCY RESTRICTION: For an event es of a speaker i uttering a
form with at-issue content p, and for the event el of i learning that p, es
satisfies the recency restriction iff es ∈ TARGET(el).
Since we claim that all mirative markers impose a recency restriction on the
expression of speaker surprise, we can revise the informal account of English
exclamation in (30) as follows.
(32) a. Hawk won (the race yesterday)!
b.
at-issue proposition p = λw. hawk won in w
not-at-issue restriction
illocutionary relation propose to add p to CG
es ∈ TARGET(el)→ speaker did not
expect that p
This will be revised one final time below in (33).
5.3 An epistemic component
Mirative evidentials are, without known exception, indirect evidentials. We claim
that indirect evidentials (as opposed to direct) have in common that they relate the
at-issue proposition p to some contextually salient set E of epistemically accessible
propositions. We’ll briefly detail our implementation of this.
Following Rett (2011), we characterize E in terms of expectations instead of
knowledge per se, eliminating worries about factivity. We take E to be the set of
propositions representing the expectations of an individual x, including the propo-
sitions x knows and believes about the past, present and future. They are those
propositions assigned a prior probability above some standard of credence. Just as
an individual’s knowledge base can change over time, so can her expectation base,
so we anchor each expectation state E to an individual x and a time t, written Etx.
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We use E to characterize the illocutionary component of exclamation: an ex-
clamation that p amounts to an expression that p was not in the speaker’s set of
expectations E when the speaker learned that p (the time of the learning event,
τ(el)). We represent this as in (33), revised from (32).
(33) a. Hawk won (the race yesterday)!
b.
at-issue proposition p = λw. hawk won in w
not-at-issue restriction
illocutionary relation propose to add p to CG
es ∈ TARGET(el)→ p /∈ Eτ(el)i
The illocutionary mood component should be seen as an update of E-FORCE that
takes the recency restriction into account. We claim that it is (part of) the contribution
of any mirative marker. Though this expressive component does not structure the
common ground, as the contribution of the declarative mood does, it can be seen as
a type of structuring update, operating instead on a different set of propositions: E.
Indirect evidentials reference a set of expectations, too; this is what explains
the crosslinguistic association of mirativity and indirect evidentiality. In the case
of inferential evidentials, the evidential content relates p to the speaker’s set of
expectations at some salient time t prior to the learning event. We’ll represent
the evidential content in this case as Eti  p, i.e., p is entailed by the speaker’s
expectations at t. Reportative or narrative evidentials are typically characterized as
relating p to some prior speech act; we instead take the position that what’s relevant
for the evidence source is some third party’s (an individual or group of individuals)
set of expectations (and that a typically reliable way of determining the content of a
third party’s E is via their speech). In the case of reportative or narrative evidence,
then, the evidential content is Ety  p, for an individual y and a salient past time t.
Indirect evidentials may restrict the type of E by restricting the individual or
temporal arguments of E. For instance, a reportative evidential might restrict the in-
dividual argument to someone other than the speaker (and the hearer). Our tentative
claim here is that mirative evidentials are indirect evidentials that are not lexically
restricted in this way. Recall that our goal is a unified analysis of the two interpreta-
tions of MEs, the first of which (evidentiality) is encoded in not-at-issue content, and
the second of which (mirativity) is encoded in illocutionary content. This assumption
will allow the evidential contribution of MEs, in mirative contexts, to be trivial.
6 The analysis
In this section, we present a unified semantic account of the polysemy of MEs that
draws on our claim that both interpretations reference a salient set of expectations
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E. We argue that all mirative markers impose something like the recency restriction
on the expression of speaker surprise, but that MEs differ in additionally encoding
not-at-issue restrictions on E.
6.1 A unified analysis of MEs
Mirative evidentials are mirative markers that additionally encode evidential, not-at-
issue content. (34a) represents an informal characterization of the semantics of the
Cheyenne ME hoo'o.
(34) a. Hawk won-hoo'o.
b.
at-issue proposition p = λw. hawk won in w
not-at-issue restriction E  p
illocutionary relation propose to add p to CG
es ∈ TARGET(el)→ p /∈ Eτ(el)i
We’ll describe (34) by considering two distinct contexts of utterance. In the first,
the speaker learns from a folklore that Hawk won the race long ago. Several years
later, he utters (34a). In this case, the E introduced in the evidential, not-at-issue
content is valued as the community’s (c) set of expectations at that time several years
ago (t). In this case, the speech act event es is quite a bit later than the learning event
el , so the utterance fails to satisfy the recency restriction. As a result, the content
of the utterance includes: its at-issue meaning (the proposition that Hawk won); its
not-at-issue evidential meaning (that the source of information is the community’s
beliefs circa t); and its illocutionary meaning, which consists only of assertive force,
the proposal to add p to the common ground, because the antecedent of the condi-
tional in (34) failed to hold. The result is in (35b).
(35) a. Hawk won-hoo'o. evidential interpretation
b.
at-issue proposition p = λw. hawk won in w
not-at-issue restriction Etc  p
illocutionary relation propose to add p to CG
es ∈ TARGET(el)→ p /∈ Eτ(el)i
This account of the evidential use of MEs takes advantage of Rett’s (2011) claim that
the illocutionary force of mirative constructions includes an expression of surprise
that p in addition to an assertion that p.
In a second context, the speaker witnesses Hawk winning the race, turns to the
hearer, and immediately utters (36a). In this context, the salient E is the speaker’s
set of expectations. Because the recency restriction is satisfied, the illocutionary
content of the speech act is to assert that p and to express that p was not previously
in the speaker’s expectation set. The result is in (36b).
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(36) a. Hawk won-hoo'o! mirative interpretation
b.
at-issue proposition p = λw. hawk won in w
not-at-issue restriction E  p
illocutionary relation propose to add p to CG
es ∈ TARGET(el)→ p /∈ Eτ(el)i
In this context, the ME contributes no indirect evidential restriction. The question
becomes, then, what happens to the not-at-issue restriction encoded in the ME (as
demonstrated in (34)). The possible value of E in this ‘evidential’ meaning is
restricted in part by the illocutionary content: it cannot be valued by the speaker’s
expectations at the time of the learning event. It seems as though, in mirative uses of
MEs, this E is instead valued with the speaker’s expectations at the time of utterance,
or something equally trivial. If this is right, it explains how MEs mediate in the way
they do between different meanings encoded in different types of content.
The analysis offered here is one that characterizes the kinship between indirect
evidence and mirativity as an epistemic one: for one meaning, a relevant epistemic
state E is the source of evidence; in another, it enables an expression of surprise.
Our proposal explains the polysemous behavior of MEs via the recency restriction:
the temporal relation between the event of the speaker learning that p and the speech
event conditions the polysemy.
In the next section we relate our proposal to descriptive observations that the
mirative interpretation seems to correlate with present tense and/or imperfect aspect.
6.2 Connections with tense and aspect
It is often reported in the descriptive literature on mirative evidentials that the mirative
interpretation is significantly more natural in sentences inflected with present tense
and imperfect aspect. DeLancey (1997: 39) reports that the mirative interpretation
of the Hare (Athabaskan, Canada) ME lõ is “easy to elicit, but only in imperfective
clauses.” His examples, however, reveal a difference in tense as well.
(37) a. Mary
Mary
e-wé’
its-hide
ghálayeyi˜da
work.PRF
lõ.
IND
‘Mary worked on hides, I infer/hear.’
b. Mary
Mary
e-wé’
its-hide
ghálayeyeda
work.IMPF
lõ.
IND
‘Mary is working on hides!’
We suspect that the connection between mirativity and present tense is a tendency
rather than a universal. And we suspect that aspect influences whether an ME
receives a mirative or evidential interpretation only insofar as aspect tends to covary
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with tense.5
The affinity between present-tense content and mirative interpretations seems to
hold, across languages, for sentences in either imperfect (e.g., It’s raining!, (11b))
or perfect (e.g., I have come here before!) aspect. It is especially clear in Cheyenne,
where the ME is the narrative evidential: the evidential use typically occurs with the
remote past, while the mirative use typically occurs with present/recent past.
That mirative uses of MEs are most natural with present-tense content is a natural
consequence of our theory. We claim that MEs mark indirect evidence unless the
event of the speaker learning that p is recent in a relative sense to the utterance that
p. A speaker is most likely to have direct evidence for an event or result state that is
ongoing at the time of utterance (although indirect evidence isn’t precluded). If the
speaker has direct evidence for an ongoing eventuality, s/he is likely to have recently
learned that p. So present-tense propositions are more likely to receive mirative
interpretations (compare the English We’ve been robbed! with We were robbed!).
In contrast, if p is in past tense or perfect aspect, we have no reason to assume
anything about when the speaker learned that p or what sort of evidence the speaker
had that p. (For instance, an individual can assert that Napoleon was defeated at
Waterloo immediately after learning this, or not.) So while present-tense propositions
are likely to satisfy the recency restriction and involve direct evidence – and thus be
interpreted miratively – there is no such tendency for propositions in past tense or
with perfect aspect.
7 Conclusions and extensions
We began this study of mirative evidentials with some crosslinguistic empirical
observations: mirativity is polysemous with indirect evidentiality across languages
and language families. Mirative constructions, including the mirative uses of mirative
5 This perspective on the data is supported by the following example from Sunwar (Tibeto-Burman,
Nepal; DeLancey 1997: 43), where evidentiality is encoded in the copula system. (ia) is formed with
a finite, perfective verb, while (ib) is formed with a nominalized verb, which lacks aspect.
(i) a. Kyarša
goat
’sad-a
kill-3SG
’baâ-te.
exist-3SG.PAST
‘He killed a goat.’ (I hear or infer)
b. Kyarša
goat
’saî-šo
kill-NOM
’baa-te.
exist-3SG.PAST
‘[I saw] he was killing a goat.’ (e.g., when I discovered him)
DeLancey (ibid.) describes the influence of aspect: “What we see here is the grammaticization of
the pragmatic tendency toward evidential interpretation of new knowledge marking in perfective
contexts, and mirative interpretation in imperfect contexts [...]. This could be predicted, since an
event that is perfective is typically past, and therefore no longer “new knowledge.”
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evidentials, are acceptable only when the speaker has recently learned the at-issue
proposition p. And the mirative content of MEs – at least in Cheyenne – is, like
that of other mirative constructions, encoded at the illocutionary level. We have
concluded from these observations that there is a need for a unified account of
indirect evidence and mirativity that addresses different levels of meaning as well as
the timing of the utterance.
Using Rett’s (2011) account of exclamation and Murray’s (2010) account of
evidentials, we have argued that indirect evidentiality and mirativity have in common
that they relate the at-issue proposition p to some salient, contextually-valued set of
expectations E. Indirect evidentials reference E in not-at-issue content, and mirative
markers reference E in illocutionary content. In the case of MEs, E is referenced in
two types of content, with the type of interpretation conditioned by whether or not
the speaker has recently learned that p.
DeLancey (2001) and others have observed that some types of at-issue content
are more likely to trigger the mirative interpretations of MEs: ps inflected for
second-person, present-tense and imperfect aspect. We’ve argued that the indirect
evidetiality of MEs, combined with the recency restriction, means that MEs inflected
in present tense are biased towards mirative interpretations. More work is needed to
determine whether or not this explanation generalizes crosslinguistically.
There are many potential connections between this analysis and work done on
related areas. The characterization of indirect evidentials as having an epistemic
component – the contextually valued set of propositions E – suggests a clear connec-
tion with languages whose indirect evidentials behave like epistemic modals (Chafe
& Nichols 1986; Izvorski 1997; de Haan 1999; Faller 2006; Matthewson et al. 2007).
We argue for a close connection between the interpretation of MEs and the
tense of the at-issue proposition p. This connection may have consequences for
languages (like Guaraní; Tupian, South America) whose evidential system is encoded
in tense marking (and whose present-tense, inferential marker seems to have a
mirative interpretation; Velázquez-Castillo 2013). If there is a secondary connection
between mirativity and aspect, as we argue, then there is an intriguing potential
connection between our work and languages (like Andean Spanish) whose imperfect
aspect marker also marks mirativity (Torres Bustamante 2012), as well as languages
whose perfect marker is polysemous with (Turkish; Izvorski 1997) or conflated with
(Bulgarian; Koev 2011) an indirect evidential marker. But such extensions will
require significantly more investigation into the connection between tense, aspect,
and mirative evidentials.
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